Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told a gathering in Hyderabad that India “will not let the waters of the Sindhu reach the patrons of terrorists and enemies of humanity.” He was echoing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s earlier line that “blood and water cannot flow together.” These are not off-script statements. They are a part of a coordinated messaging campaign that started with the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty in April 2025 and has steadily continued since.
Singh’s comments did not pose a new threat. They affirmed that the coercion of water is now official Indian policy, and it is said, and repeated at the Indian ministerial level, without question. Union Home Minister Amit Shah went further, stating that the Indus Waters Treaty cannot ever be restored and the government would build a canal to divert the water flowing to Pakistan. Jal Shakti Minister C.R. Patil said the government is working to ensure that “not a single drop of water that India can utilize goes to Pakistan in the coming years.” This is a pattern, not a single comment.
What the Treaty Actually Says
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in September 1960. It survived four wars, several military standoffs, and six decades of hostile diplomacy. It survived because it was built to survive. The treaty contains no suspension or termination clause. It is permanent and can only be amended by mutual agreement, as per Article XII.
India’s decision to place the treaty “in abeyance” has no legal foundation. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, two conditions must be met for suspension: material breach of a treaty, or fundamental change of circumstances. India has not demonstrated either. ICJ has reiterated the principle of “good faith and stability of conventional law in international treaty relations”: No one party can unilaterally withdraw from an obligation due to altered “political and social conditions”. No security incident, no matter how severe, is eligible.
The Court of Arbitration affirmed this directly. In its June 2025 supplemental award, the Court held that a “merely unilateral suspension per se cannot render jurisdictional clauses inoperative” and confirmed that Pakistan’s position, that India’s use of “abeyance” has no meaning under the treaty or international law, was legally sound. India has even denied the Court’s jurisdiction altogether, itself a violation of the treaty’s own dispute resolution clause.
Under the treaty’s survival clause of Article IX, parties shall continue to implement the provisions of the treaty normally in case of dispute until an acceptable resolution is achieved. India is not in a legal grey area. It is in breach.
The Real Costs on the Ground
Singh’s remarks come as Pakistan’s water position deteriorates. The usable water reserves plummeted in June 2025, with experts estimating a loss of 723,000 acre-feet in four days. Pakistan experienced 67% less rainfall than usual in the winter of 2024 to 2025, making the season one of the driest in the country’s history. According to data from Sindh’s irrigation department, the Northwest Canal faces a 64.1% deficit, the Rice Canal a 38% shortfall, and the Dadu Canal an 82% shortfall.
These numbers are not abstract. Pakistan relies on the Indus Basin Irrigation System for around 90% of its agricultural output. The Indus River accounts for 25% of Pakistan’s GDP. Weaponizing water in this context is not a political gesture. This is a direct attack on Pakistan’s food security and on the livelihood of tens of millions of people in Sindh and Punjab. India presents this as a counter-terrorism measure. Framing is not relevant. Those who are affected by canal shortages and crop failures are not the sponsors of terrorism in Sindh. They are the most defenseless victims.
Pakistan’s answer has been sensible and appropriate. It has sought legal avenues in international arbitration, brought the issue to the attention of the UN Security Council, and taken a stance that is in line with existing international law. Pakistan’s stance is not in response to Singh’s remarks. It is a continuous legal argument that the treaty is binding, permanent, and non-negotiable. India has stated that the Indus Waters Treaty will remain on hold till Pakistan takes “credible and irreversible steps” to stop helping cross-border terrorism, and it has drawn the definition of the steps it requires unilaterally. No treaty in the history of international law has been left intact when applied to it unilaterally by one of the contracting parties.
It is not the novelty of Singh’s statements that is so dangerous. It’s their normalization. Every time a senior minister says it again and again without repercussions, it becomes more of a doctrine than a threat. When powerful states can change international obligations through political pressure and threats, it has consequences beyond South Asia. This case is being closely followed by each downstream state that shares a river with a more powerful upstream state. The example that India is setting is a weak one. It is a selective legality, in which rules are in effect for others but not for oneself.
Pakistan has clearly stated that water is a fundamental national concern and a strategic red line. That’s based on the law, the geography, and the daily lives of 220 million people whose food, livelihoods, and futures depend on rivers that are now a tool of pressure for a neighboring state. The Indus Waters Treaty was designed to outlast conflict. India is putting that design to the test. The answer from international law is unambiguous. The response from New Delhi continues to be threatening.
