On July 9, in Melbourne, Australia and India signed an agreement allowing uranium exports to New Delhi. This pact has existed since 2014 but remained inactive for over a decade due to Canberra’s concerns about uranium possibly ending up in Indian warheads.
Those fears have now eased. The agreement was signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia, which also included broader cooperation in defense and critical minerals, as well as the establishment of a shared space-tracking facility on the Cocos Islands.
Before this agreement, India signed a $2.8 billion nuclear uranium supply deal with Canada earlier this year. Both deals stem from the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, which was supported by Washington.
This waiver permitted India, a Non-Proliferation Treaty non-signatory, to import nuclear uranium from group members despite testing nuclear weapons outside the treaty. The opening was further enabled by waivers for Australia and Canada.
India officially applied for full NSG membership in 2016 but remains blocked, mainly due to China’s demand for criteria-based rather than country-specific admission. Thus, India finds itself in a unique position: outside the club yet being granted access by some members.
This issue is not just a minor diplomatic point for Pakistan; it is a fundamental problem. Even if uranium imported for “exclusively peaceful purposes” remains secure, it contributes to India’s total fissile material production. This enables India to use domestically mined and enriched uranium for military purposes as well.
The concern is more about nuclear capacity than direct diversion. The trend doesn’t offer much reassurance: SIPRI’s Yearbook 2026 estimates India’s nuclear warhead stockpile increased from about 180 to 190 in that year, with roughly 12 now believed to be “operationally deployed, mounted on delivery systems or assigned to active forces. This marks a significant shift toward a more measured approach, separating warheads from launchers, and represents a genuine change in the strategic balance in South Asia.
Pakistan often dismisses such issues as mere “hypocrisy,” pointing out India’s import of uranium for “peaceful” purposes while secretly accumulating stocks, which is a valid concern.
However, excessive outrage isn’t a strategy. For Pakistan, obtaining the NSG waiver and bilateral uranium agreements with India presents a diplomatic and strategic opportunity. They should aim to transform that goodwill into concrete institutional demands rather than merely protesting.
The positive sentiment from the US towards Pakistan is evident, as Islamabad’s efforts to mediate between Washington and Tehran amid ongoing talks have received unusual praise from US leadership, including a rare acknowledgment by President Donald Trump. This marks a significant shift after years of often strained, transactional relations.
Islamabad should view this moment cautiously: it should propose a US-Pakistan civil nuclear cooperation framework similar to the 2008 agreement between the US and India, and simultaneously pursue its long-standing case for NSG membership—an effort not pursued as fervently as India’s.
Pursuing NSG membership based on established criteria, alongside maintaining a friendly US relationship, would likely be more sustainable than seeking support solely from Canberra or Ottawa.
It is important to highlight that The US and Saudi Arabia have moved ahead on a similar civil nuclear cooperation deal, formally approved after years of on-off negotiations under both Trump and Biden.
The agreement provides a legal framework for transferring US nuclear material and technology to Saudi Arabia’s civilian program, and controversially skips the IAEA’s stricter Additional Protocol safeguards, relying instead on a bilateral US-Saudi arrangement.
However, a day later, Trump posted on Truth Social that the deal was “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords — catching even his own White House off guard. He also insisted there would be “no enrichment of material” and that the deal covers only non-military use, seemingly walking back the enrichment provisions reported earlier.
For Pakistan, the benefits would be clear. Allowing legal and protected uranium imports would help Pakistan address its current uranium shortfall, support its efforts to expand nuclear power, and fulfill its commitments to sustainable development, clean energy, and civil nuclear trade. This shift moves the narrative from “Pakistan versus India’s double standards” to recognizing Pakistan as a legitimate civil nuclear partner, strengthening its position in the debate.
Pakistan’s NSG membership case should be advanced on the basis of fairness and clear criteria. It is preferable to frame this as a fairness issue rather than a competitive one. For a rules-based approach, all candidates must be treated equally.
However, Pakistan must also recognize that entry into the NSG cannot be achieved through pressure alone. Persistent diplomacy, support from major powers, and broader trust-building efforts, especially around export controls and nuclear governance, are essential.
Pakistan should avoid reactive narratives and adopt a long-term strategy to tackle these issues: uphold nonproliferation principles, advocate for fair treatment in global institutions, and responsibly project Pakistan’s civilian nuclear needs with a future-oriented perspective. This approach can transform a regional challenge into a diplomatic opportunity.
Musavir Hameed Barech
Musavir Hameed Barech is currently serving as a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network, Quetta, and can be reached at his email:musavirkhan88@gmail.com
