The international security community often falls into the trap of novelty, eagerly identifying new threats to justify the evolution of counterterrorism frameworks. But when it comes to the security of Pakistan, the emergence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is not such a recent occurrence but rather an adept practice of covering the face. This is a fatal analytical error to assume that ISKP is an entity independent of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Continuity of ISKP-TTP is the hallmark of contemporary militancy in the region. Over the decades, the same rebel network has been used to attack the Pakistani state, the tribal elders, and its moderate religious scholars. The flags might be different, from the banners of TTP to the black standards of the Islamic State; however, the fighters, goals, and logistic networks remain the same. In the past, the ISKP was established by dissatisfied TTP leaders, including Hafiz Saeed Khan and other prominent leaders, who took with them their operational networks.
The difference between these groups is not so much about ideology as it is about narrative utility. The ISKP label takes the global blame, and the TTP continues to give an appearance of local relevance. This ambiguity ensures that while the violence persists, accountability remains diffused, making it harder for the international community to pin responsibility on specific actors or their cross-border sanctuaries. Security monitors have observed that even though the groups, at times, have conflicts, they are usually tactical partners in Pakistan to ensure that security forces are off-balance.
This transformation was accelerated by the fall of Kabul in 2021. The mass transfer of veteran operatives out of Afghan prison systems didn’t generate new generations of rebels; it enabled old fighters, displaced by the last military action of the Pakistani government, to reorganize. With this relaxed atmosphere, ISKP came into the picture not as a competitor to the TTP but as a pressure valve. It takes away the global attention and enables the essence of TTP to live under another name. The TTP continues to be the main recruiting force of ISKP, according to the 36th Report of the United Nations Security Council Monitoring Team and the CSIS Terrorism Backgrounders, and this means that as the TTP consolidates its power, it easily controls the supply of manpower into the hands of its competitor.
The fighters of both groups can be different, working under different banners, but their logic on the battlefield will always be the same, i.e., to destabilize Pakistan, threaten its religious leadership, and maintain a state of insecurity with ambiguous strategies. To Pakistan and the international community, recognition of this ISKP-TTP continuity is a strategic requirement. The diplomacy towards Afghanistan and regional counterterrorism policies cannot be effective when established on the illusion of separate threats. The inability to identify this tactical change has practical implications. It postpones responsibility, misleads global pressure, and gives these networks a chance to outpace the policies meant to dismantle them. The security challenge that Pakistan is facing is not evolving in nature but simply changing in terms of how it is presented.
