For over three months, the silence at the Chaman border crossing and other key transit points between Pakistan and Afghanistan has spoken volumes. What, at first glance, looks like a logistical shutdown because of the alleged security issues is in fact a symptom of a more primordial malaise. It is estimated that Afghanistan loses a monthly profit of two hundred million dollars a day. However, it is not a matter of only trucking or transit trade but rather a new chapter in a story of missed opportunities, mistrust between each other, and unresolved historical disputes dating back to pre-partition times of the subcontinent.
The 1944 Precursor: Sabotaging a Nascent State
The tension at hand can only be comprehended by going back to 1944, three years before Pakistan existed at all. The Afghan government at that period wrote to the British Viceroy of India with a shocking demand to revoke the Durand Line settlement, a boundary made by their own forefathers, and surrender these provinces to Afghanistan.
This action was a strategic move to establish a rift even before Pakistan could establish its feet. When Pakistan was ultimately established in 1947, Afghanistan was the only nation to reject its membership in the United Nations. This was not an overnight outburst, but the outcome of decades of ethno-fascist and sub-nationalist political action seeking to recover what they saw as a lost Pashtun empire.
The Myth of Modern Incursion
A common narrative suggests that Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan began with the Soviet invasion or the rise of the Taliban. However, historical records tell a different story. From 1947 until the 1970s, it was Afghanistan that consistently challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty. Only six weeks before August 1947, Afghanistan’s General Dawood, who would later become the President, had deployed three divisions of the army into the tribal areas of Pakistan in an effort to re-conquer them.
During the 1950s, Afghanistan created a governmental agency under the title of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs with the sole purpose of provoking tribal aspects in the Pakistani frontiers. They sponsored radio stations to carry Pashtunistan propaganda and even dispatched tanks into Bajaur in 1959. It was only after decades of these provocations, and the eventual breakup of Pakistan in 1971, that Pakistan’s policy shifted toward countering Afghan propaganda to ensure its own Defense.
The Pashtun Lens and the Afghanistan Diversity
A major mistake in Pakistani thinking is to interpret Afghanistan in Pashtun terms. As the Pashtun belt, about 40 per cent of the population, has been a traditional source of nationalist complaint regarding the Durand Line, the remainder 50-60 per cent of the nation (Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) have an entirely different view. These Dari-speaking (Persian) populations frequently do not have the same ethno-nationalist hatred of Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the Kabul ruling elite has traditionally used the issue of the Durand Line as a political tool to consolidate power. Leaders such as Hamid Karzai are reported to have admitted privately that, as much as the border is a practical consideration, it is politically significant to keep the dispute alive to maintain domestic credibility.
The Shadow of India and the Gaza Contrast
Another factor that makes the modern world complicated is the existence of regional competitors. The influence of India in Afghanistan thrived during the Karzai and Ashraf Ghani regimes. This was not just diplomatic but cultural and strategic, and India was using Afghan soil to make a proxy war against Pakistan.
The most prominent irony is the fact that the Taliban government today is warming up to India when Pakistan has taken a principled, vocal stand on international issues like Gaza. While the Muslim world looked toward Pakistan during recent regional conflicts for its defensive capabilities and moral stance, some elements of the Afghan leadership were seen standing with those whose interests align against Pakistani stability. This timing has been perceived as a betrayal of Islamic solidarity and indicative of the fact that nationalism continues to dominate the religious commonality in Kabul corridors of power.
Is There a Way Forward?
The road to reconciliation is full of challenges. To Pakistan, this is still the main issue of making sure that anti-state militants do not use Afghan soil. In the case of Afghanistan, the question is how to shed a century-old ethno-nationalistic history that has reduced Afghanistan to an economically crippled, diplomatically isolated territory.
Pakistan has to diversify its diplomacy. It needs to reach out to the non-Pashtun population of Afghanistan that is largely marginalized by the ethno-fascist policies of the ruling elite more vigorously, rather than putting all the eggs in the Pashtun basket. With the widening of the relationship to include other ethnic groups, the region could finally seek a balance that no longer relies on the so-called political weapon, the Durand Line, and instead, will enjoy a mutual economic success. The tragedy of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is not that they are enemies, but that they have forgotten how to be neighbours.
