On April 28, 2026, the United Arab Emirates did something it had been considering for years and finally had reason enough to do. It declared its withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+, effective May 1, concluding what started with the original membership of Abu Dhabi into the organization in 1967. The official language was measured. The UAE’s state media carried a statement saying the move reflects the UAE’s long-term strategic and economic vision and evolving energy profile. The undertones were more intense. The UAE had spent years chafing under production quotas while Saudi Arabia led the group’s output discipline. The Iran war provided it with time to exit without inflicting instant destruction on the market. It seized at that moment.
The numbers behind the decision are straightforward. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company invested $150 billion to develop the UAE hydrocarbon production capacity, which increased by almost 40% within six years, up to the current capacity of 4.85 million barrels a day. The UAE has a goal of 5 million barrels per day in 2027, which was a revised version of a goal of 2030. Within OPEC+, the quota of the UAE had a limit of 3.4 million barrels per day, so it was producing almost three times less than it was capable of. Remaining in the cartel implied forfeiting billions a quarter of their income. The UAE watched Iraq and Russia routinely exceed their own quotas without consequence.
The Iran war accelerated the timeline but did not create the frustration. It simply removed the last reason for restraint. The Iran conflict and the Strait of Hormuz closure had already cut off an estimated 14.5 million barrels per day of Persian Gulf crude from global markets, including the UAE’s own exports. As the Strait was shut and production was limited in the whole region, there was virtually no immediate market response to the news of an OPEC exit. This was a break-up that was planned with the least short-term interference and maximum freedom in the long run.
What OPEC Loses
The cartel can absorb members leaving. It has before. What it cannot easily replace is what the UAE specifically brought to the group. Saudi Arabia and the UAE together controlled a majority of the world’s total spare production capacity of more than 4 million barrels per day, the idle production that can be brought online quickly to address supply shocks. It is that excess capacity that makes OPEC really powerful in a crisis. In the absence of the UAE, that strength is reduced. Saudi Arabia finds itself bearing even greater responsibility for price management.
The political aspect of the exit is as important as the economic one. The UAE’s diplomatic adviser to the president publicly criticized fellow Arab states for not doing enough to protect it from Iranian attacks during the war. That was said the day before the OPEC exit announcement. It was not coincidental. The UAE felt exposed during the war and concluded that the solidarity it had expected from within OPEC’s Gulf bloc did not materialize when it mattered most.
What Comes Next
The UAE announced that it will slowly boost production to serve the world markets after the Strait of Hormuz is open for free transit to the world markets. That is the moment the full consequences of this decision become visible to oil markets. Once the war between the US and Iran is over and the Strait is open, analysts anticipate that the UAE will produce as much oil as possible, which it has had in reserve all along the war. This addition to supply will not be limited by a quota, and this will cause downward pressure on prices. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has to depend on revenues to cope with its own post-war fiscal situation.
Citi raised its oil price forecast, predicting Brent could rise to $150 per barrel and average $130 through the third quarter before dropping toward $100 by year-end. The short-term figures show the Strait closure. The long-term numbers will reflect a post-OPEC UAE pumping at full capacity. That is the calculation that the UAE made. OPEC will spend ten years dealing with the aftermath of it.
