Most of the coverage framed the departure of JD Vance, boarding Air Force Two and leaving Islamabad on April 12, as a failure. It was not. It was the end of Round 1 in a negotiation that was never going to conclude in 21 hours. Now Vance, alongside Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, is heading back to the same city, the same hotels, and the same table. The ceasefire expires on April 22. The fundamental controversies remain unclear on the ground. So, the obvious question arises that what actually changed between Round 1 and Round 2?
The answer is not found in Trump’s Truth Social posts or Iran’s IRNA statements. It is found in the nine days of Pakistani diplomacy that happened in between. Those nine days were, by any measure, the most concentrated stretch of back-channel work that the Islamabad process has produced. Field Marshal Munir flew to Tehran carrying a new message from Washington. He met Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, President Pezeshkian, and the commander of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. That last meeting is significant. The IRGC has been the most consistent spoiler of every diplomatic signal from Tehran’s political establishment. Gen. Munir meeting its operational command directly was not protocol. It was a conscious attempt to narrow the disconnect between what the Iranian politicians say at the table and what the military accepts on the ground.
What Pakistan Changed in the Nine Days
The sources close to the mediation effort reported that Pakistani mediators were optimistic about a potential breakthrough on Iran’s nuclear programme, specifically citing Gen. Munir’s visit to Tehran as the reason for cautious hope. That is a more precise signal than general diplomatic language. It implies that the discussions in Tehran yielded at least a reduction in the stances towards enrichment, although no official change has been publicly admitted by either party.
Simultaneously, PM Sharif toured Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, shoring up the regional consensus behind the process. The four countries, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, convened at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum and agreed on a framework for the second round. In a statement to the press, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan said the first ceasefire was not sufficient to solve the problems between the US and Iran and specifically requested an extension so that negotiators have more time. That regional scaffolding matters. It provides Washington and Tehran with political space to resume negotiations.
Round 2 also has a different structure than Round 1. Unlike the first round, Pakistan was aiming for multiple days of negotiations in the second round, with the goal of agreeing on a memorandum of understanding that could extend the ceasefire by up to 60 days. This is a deliberate shift in strategy. Round 1 tried to reach a final framework in one compressed session. Round 2 aims to deliver a holding agreement, an official break that allows each side to have extra time to iron out the most difficult questions. That is a more realistic objective, and it reflects lessons Pakistan learned from watching Round 1 collapse under the pressure of a single deadline.
The Gaps That Still Remain
All this does not imply that the barriers have vanished. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister told the press at Antalya that Tehran will not hand over its enriched uranium to the US, calling it a non-starter. The main stumbling blocks remain Iran’s nuclear programme, Strait of Hormuz transit, ballistic missiles, and drones. Iran’s position on the blockade has hardened further after the US Navy seized the Iranian container ship Touska in the Gulf of Oman. Tehran referred to it as piracy. Iran’s parliament speaker wrote on X on Tuesday that “we do not accept negotiations under the shadow of threats.” And yet, despite having IRNA declare Iran would not go to Round 2, reports are emerging that Iran had indicated it would come with a delegation. The public posture and the private position are not the same thing. They rarely are at this stage of negotiation.
After Round 1, the FM of Iran, Araghchi, stated that both parties were moments away from reaching an MoU when the US changed its stance. That is not the language of two parties that have nothing to say to each other. It is the language of two parties that got close enough to see the shape of a deal, then pulled back. Pakistan’s job between rounds was to find out whether that inch of distance had widened or narrowed. The answer, based on what Munir’s meetings produced, appears to be that it narrowed. Inadequate to make a final agreement. Possibly enough for a second round to produce the MoU that Round 1 could not.
Islamabad is ready. The hotels are cleared. The security is implemented. Vance is in the air. Whether Iran walks through the door is still, as of today, genuinely uncertain. But the nine days between rounds were not wasted. Pakistan spent every hour of them working to have Round 2. That is what changed.
