The Iran war entered its 67th day on May 6, 2026, with no peace deal signed, the ceasefire under daily strain, and a new diplomatic axis forming in Beijing that could determine whether the Islamabad process has a future at all. The picture on the ground is complicated. The US Secretary of State said on Tuesday that the military combat phase of the war against Iran was over, suggesting the US priority had shifted to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Within hours, the administration launched and then suspended a new naval operation in the same waterway. The contradiction is not accidental. It is the easiest example of where the conflict is in fact.
On Monday, the US announced “Project Freedom,” a military-backed effort using guided-missile destroyers, more than 100 aircraft, and 15,000 service members to guide commercial vessels through the strait. As the first two commercial ships attempted transit under US protection, Iran launched a barrage of missiles and drones at the vessels. By Tuesday evening, the US paused Project Freedom entirely, with the president citing diplomatic progress and the request of Pakistan and other countries as the reason for the pause. The operation lasted less than 48 hours. Iran’s IRGC Navy described it as a retreat. The White House termed it a diplomatic gesture. The practical impact is that the strait is still closed, Iranian maritime traffic regulations are still in force, and no commercial ship has been able to transit freely without Iranian vetting since February 28.
The humanitarian and economic costs of such a closure are now quite evident. Before the war, approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Business travel has come to a halt, and the shutdown has created the greatest worldwide oil production decline in history, and the cost of fuel has risen sharply across importing economies. The UAE’s defense ministry said it was responding to another Iranian drone and missile attack on Tuesday, reporting that Emirati air defenses had engaged 15 missiles and four drones from Iran the previous day, one of which sparked a fire at a key oil facility, wounding three workers. The ceasefire, technically still in place, is being violated in practice by both sides on a near-daily basis.
Beijing Enters the Frame
The most significant development of the past 48 hours did not happen in the Strait. It occurred in Beijing. On Wednesday, the Iranian foreign minister made his first trip to China since the war broke out on February 28, meeting his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi to discuss what was said to be bilateral relations and the progress of the region. It is conscious timing at all levels. The meeting is scheduled one week before the US president is scheduled to hold a meeting with the president of China in Beijing, May 14 and 15, a visit that had been postponed by over a month precisely because of the Iran war.
China’s top diplomat is expected to pressure Tehran on two specific points: maintaining the ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. China, the world’s largest purchaser of Gulf oil and gas, has been able to absorb the Hormuz shock through domestic stockpiles and a diversified energy mix, but Beijing has not been indefinitely generous with the closure. Iran’s foreign minister is simultaneously seeking clarity from Beijing on what China will offer or concede when its president meets the US president, and whether those concessions could come at Tehran’s expense. That concern is legitimate. A Trump-Xi meeting that results in a joint framework on Iran, without Iranian involvement, will leave Tehran negotiating against a pre-determined position.
China has called repeatedly for an immediate ceasefire and free commercial shipping through the strait but has also continued buying Iranian oil in defiance of US sanctions. At the same time, it reportedly pushed back against Washington’s financial pressure on Chinese refiners by invoking a blocking rule for the first time, directing Chinese companies not to comply with US sanctions. Beijing is both the most significant economic lifeline that Iran has and one of the few actors with adequate leverage to bring the position of Tehran.
What Comes Next
The Islamabad process that has been stalled now lies within a broader diplomatic process. The US Secretary of State has urged China specifically to pressurize Iran to loosen its grip on the Strait of Hormuz, and Germany has repositioned a minesweeping naval ship to the Mediterranean in anticipation of a possible future international initiative to clear the waterway. The international architecture around the conflict is expanding beyond Pakistan’s mediation framework. It does not necessarily pose a threat to the role of Islamabad. It is, though, an indication that the conflict has become so huge that it can no longer be held by only one mediator.
The core sticking points have not moved. The topmost demands of Iran include the termination of the US naval blockade in Iranian ports, the right to resume nuclear enrichment, and official recognition of Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz traffic. The demands of Washington have been a significant rollback of the Iranian nuclear programme, free commercial transit across the strait, and the end of the Iranian drone and missile attacks on partners in the Gulf. Neither party has officially taken a step on any of these stances publicly. What has moved is the diplomatic geography. The dialogue that started in Islamabad is currently operating concurrently in Beijing, Muscat, Moscow, and Antalya. Whether that expansion accelerates a deal or diffuses the pressure needed to produce one is the defining question of the next two weeks.
