For years, Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of allowing its territory to be used by militant groups. Pakistani officials have raised these concerns at press briefings, the United Nations and international meetings.
But these claims have often received limited international attention because detailed, independently verified evidence has not always been available.
A recent report reviewed by The News has brought fresh attention to the issue. The report makes serious claims about alleged coordination between the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afghanistan’s intelligence structures and India’s RAW. It refers to meetings, funding and alleged cooperation between militant groups.
Read more: https://www.thenews.pk/print/1438212-raw-taliban-nexus-behind-proxy-attacks-sources
A Familiar Story With a Missing Piece
The document names the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan as the two groups actually carrying out the violence. Both are already banned outfits, both have long histories of attacks inside Pakistan. What is new is the claim that they are no longer operating as separate movements chasing separate goals. According to the document, 2025 is when the real convergence began, built on training camps that BLA fighters were already using on Afghan soil with GDI’s backing. From there, the report says, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada, personally set the direction for GDI to bring BLA and TTP closer together, with India’s RAW stepping in to help arrange the money.
That is the headline claim, and it is a serious one. If even part of it holds up, it means Pakistan is not just fighting two separate insurgencies in Balochistan and KP. It is fighting one coordinated campaign, quietly stitched together across three intelligence services, using two different militant brands as its public face.
What makes this document read differently from the usual accusations is the level of detail in the meeting record. It is not a vague reference to “coordination.” It is a sequence of specific sit-downs, each with a date and a purpose.
The first is placed on May 26, 2026, when Mullah Shireen, the Taliban’s governor of Kandahar, is said to have met AQIS and TTP figures to line up support for BLA. Then, in July, three follow-up meetings are laid out one after another. In the first, GDI is said to have promised full backing for BLA’s operations inside Pakistan. In the second, held at a TTP compound in Kandahar, BLA reportedly handed over 3.5 million Afghanis to Jamat-ul-Ahrar. In the third, described as a meeting between RAW and the head of GDI held outside Afghanistan, the two sides are said to have agreed to fund joint BLA-TTP attacks in Balochistan, with RAW putting in more than 7.8 million US dollars.
Then comes the August 26 summit in Kandahar, described as an emergency meeting under the patronage of the Taliban administration itself. This is where the document gets specific about who was in the room: senior BLA figures including Bashir Zeb, Khalil Baloch, Sifatullah Mengal, Anwar Nizami and Majeed Baloch, sitting across from TTP and allied commanders like Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Mullah Mirajuddin, Mullah Asad Waziristani and Mujeeb ur Rehman Gujjar. The reported subject was manpower. BLA is said to have told the room it was short on fighters, and TTP and AQIS are said to have promised to fill the gap with their own men, weapons and logistics, right across Balochistan.
There is also a paper trail on weapons. The document points to a directive from the Taliban’s own Directorate of Bait ul Maal Stability, Registration and Supervision, ordering assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition to be released to a group called the Baloch Refugee Coordination Office, described in the document as nothing more than a front name for BLA. If accurate, that is not passive tolerance of militancy on Afghan soil. That is a state directorate signing off on weapons for a group that then goes and attacks Pakistan.
Why the BLA Label Matters More Than It Looks
The most striking part of the document is not the meetings or the money. It is the claim about who actually pulls the trigger. According to the sources cited, TTP and AQIS fighters are doing much of the real fighting, while BLA is the one standing up afterward to claim responsibility. The reasoning given is simple: AQIS is on the US sanctions list, so keeping its name out of the headlines protects it from international scrutiny. BLA, as a Baloch nationalist group, does not carry the same baggage, so it is allowed to take the credit in public even when it is not the group doing the killing.
The document points to the September 4 attack in Ziarat as an example. BLA claimed it. The intelligence sources say TTP carried it out. A former TTP man, Mullah Merajuddin Farahi, is named as the person moving manpower, money and weapons over to BLA. And newly recruited Baloch youth, the document says, are being trained at an AQIS facility run by a commander named Mullah Obaidullah Asim.
If this framing is right, it changes how every future BLA attack should be read. A claim of responsibility is no longer just a claim of responsibility. It might be a label stuck onto violence that was planned, funded and carried out by an entirely different network, one with roots that go straight back to Kandahar and, this document alleges, to RAW.
Pakistani officials say this simply confirms what they have suspected for a long time. The Taliban side has not responded. But it is an allegation with names, dates and numbers attached, and that is what makes it hard to wave away.
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